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NO. 50 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Emmanuel Macron’s “New Way” 
Setting the Course for Re-election in 2022 
Ronja Kempin and Dominik Rehbaum 
French President Emmanuel Macron wants to be re-elected in 2022. In view of citi-
zens’ disenchantment with the political and social order of their country and the 
consequences of the Corona pandemic, the president feels compelled to embark on 
a “new way”. This new approach has three components: a move away from the policy 
of budget consolidation, a political positioning within the neoliberal-conservative 
faction of the political spectrum, and greater proximity to the people. If Macron 
receives interim support from the European Union (EU) to cushion the consequences 
of Covid-19 for France’s economic and social system, he should be able to strengthen 
reform forces at home and enable France to broker compromises on vital subjects 
concerning EU reform. 
 
In May 2017 Emmanuel Macron was elected 
to the Elysée Palace because he had prom-
ised to transform and reconcile France. 
Three years later, the president has his back 
to the wall. The reforms, which were swiftly 
implemented against widespread opposi-
tion, did indeed achieve initial successes: 
At the beginning of the year, the unemploy-
ment rate had fallen to 7.8% (2.3 million 
unemployed), its lowest level since the out-
break of the financial and debt crisis in 
2008/2009; the rise in public debt was also 
halted. However, President Macron has 
failed to convince his citizens of the neces-
sity for his policy. Since his election, his 
presidency has been accompanied by pro-
tests and poor poll results. Following the 
Yellow Vests protests and strikes by the 
French national railway company SNCF, a 
general strike against the planned pension 
reform paralysed France for weeks in the 
winter of 2019/2020. 
During the Corona crisis, only 29% of 
French people were satisfied with the initial 
crisis management of their president. At the 
end of June, Macron was downright pun-
ished: In the local elections, the presiden-
tial party, La République en Marche (LREM), 
won almost none of the mayoralties in the 
35,000 municipalities. Macron has not been 
able to reconcile the population with its 
political elite through his politics and style 
of leadership. Three-quarters of French 
people feel that their country’s social order 
is “unjust”. For 79%, politics conjure nega-
tive associations; 85% think that politicians 
in France are not taking care of their con-
cerns. As a result, fewer and fewer people 
go to the polls. In the presidential elections, 
the proportion of non-voters rose from 16% 
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to 25.4% between 2007 and 2017 (in 2017, 
11.5% cast an empty or invalid ballot for 
the first time). Whereas 40% of the popu-
lation decided not to cast a ballot in the 
2007 Parliamentary elections, this number 
rose to 57.4% in 2017. In the local elections 
at the end of June 2020, 60% of voters did 
not take part. 
A New Way 
Macron reacted to these developments in 
early July 2020. He reshuffled his govern-
ment and promised the people a “new 
way”. In doing so, he is attempting to 
secure his re-election in spring 2022 while 
preserving the conditions for the country’s 
transformation. 
Strong State Instead of Reforms 
In his first government statement on 
15 July 2020, France’s new prime minister, 
Jean Castex, tried to show how France 
could recover “from one of the most seri-
ous health crises it has ever experienced”: 
A drastic rise in unemployment should 
be prevented and the economy should be 
modernised to bring it out of the crisis. 
France has been one of the countries 
most affected by the pandemic. By the end 
of August 2020, more than 30,500 people 
had died from Covid-19, although the 
toughest lockdown in the EU prevented the 
virus from spreading uncontrollably. How-
ever, the number of new infections is now 
rising significantly. The 55-day curfew im-
posed in spring 2020 (from 16 March to 11 
May 2020) led to a dramatic collapse of the 
French economy. In the second quarter of 
2020, the country’s economic performance 
dropped 13.8% from the previous quarter, 
even coming in below the euro area average 
(-12.1%). For autumn, the government ex-
pects a 20% increase in corporate insolven-
cies: 60,000 companies are about to go out 
of business. The consequences for the 
labour market are dramatic: In April, 10.8 
million people – almost a third of the 
30,455 million employed (2019 figure) – 
were on short-time work. In September, 
800,000 school leavers were coming onto 
the labour market – most of them with no 
job prospects. By spring 2021, the govern-
ment estimates that about 1 million jobs 
will be lost, and the unemployment rate is 
predicted to reach 11.5% next year. 
The government in Paris is doing every-
thing in its power to mitigate the economic 
and social consequences of the pandemic. 
Under Prime Minister Edouard Philippe, it 
had provided €463 billion in assistance to 
employees, the self-employed, and busi-
nesses – of which €58 billion was in the 
form of budgetary support and €401 billion 
in the form of guarantees. The additional 
financial support of almost €100 billion 
announced by Prime Minister Castex will 
continue to finance short-time work, create 
apprenticeships, and promote vocational 
training. Strategic industries will receive 
grants to transfer skills back to France in 
strategic sectors and reduce dependence on 
foreign countries. These measures will not 
be financed through tax increases but with 
EU money (€50.6 billion from the EU 
Reconstruction Fund) and a “Covid-19 debt” 
from the state. The latter will bring France’s 
public deficit to a record €2,438.5 billion 
and raise the debt level to more than 121% 
of GDP. Finally, the president has declared 
that he still wants to implement the contro-
versial pension reform, but he has had to 
make considerable concessions. 
Macron’s new approach thus places civic 
and social peace at the centre of his actions. 
The president wants to counteract a pos-
sible social uprising with a “strong state” 
policy. In return, he is prepared to abandon 
the budgetary discipline that has shaped 
his policy for the last three years. 
Conservative Course Instead of 
“Ni gauche – ni droite” 
To secure another five years in the Elysée 
Palace, Macron has also turned away from 
his “neither left nor right” policy on politics. 
With his new approach, he wants to win 
over the neoliberal-conservative electorate. 
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So far, Macron has not succeeded in an-
choring his political ideas in the public 
domain. The fact that his party has been 
almost unable to succeed in the 2020 
mayoral contests is a clear indication of this 
shortcoming. Moreover, there is discord 
within the president’s party: In the National 
Assembly, more and more members of Par-
liament are leaving the LREM faction 
because of internal disputes. 
In the 2022 presidential elections, 
Macron will therefore – as in 2017 – 
be dependent on the support of others. 
Whereas in 2017 he found it on both the 
left and right sides of the political spec-
trum, his new policy approach is clearly 
geared towards the neoliberal-conservative 
faction. The appointment of Castex as the 
new prime minister and the reshuffling 
of eight ministers are a sign that Macron 
is turning to moderate conservatives. He is 
thus reacting to a shift in the balance of 
political power that began a good 10 years 
ago: Every political force that wants to 
win elections in France depends on votes 
that come from rural areas and small and 
medium-sized cities. Large cities are no 
longer the deciding factor in elections. 
Since the 1970s there has been no out-
migration from rural areas. If rural com-
munities are close enough to larger centres, 
they even gain population. In these areas, 
the electorate of the neoliberal-conservative 
forces has doubled since 2008 – at the 
expense of the socialists, whose share of 
the vote has halved. 
The new prime minister’s main task is 
therefore to bring this pool of voters to the 
president. Castex comes from a rural back-
ground and knows well the problems of 
smaller towns, where people want to pre-
serve their traditions. 
Citizen Participation Instead of 
Disenchantment with Politics 
Last but not least, President Macron’s new 
way aims at reducing the level of discontent 
with the political elite. This dissatisfaction 
has put an end to the two-party system that 
has brought stability to the country for 
more than 40 years. It is increasingly turn-
ing elections into a game of Vabanque: In 
the first round of the 2017 presidential elec-
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tions, a good half of those eligible to vote 
cast their ballots for the parties at the ex-
tremes of the political spectrum (both left 
and right). In 2020, low turnout in the local 
elections helped the Green Party to succeed 
in cities with more than 100,000 inhabit-
ants. 
This is where the president is taking the 
greatest risk. To counteract the public’s dis-
enchantment with politics, he must relin-
quish power. The state initially reacted to 
the Yellow Vests protests with administra-
tive reforms. However, the geographical 
distribution of public services – health care 
facilities, access to digital infrastructure, 
and public services – is still being decided 
in Paris. The problem is that equal stand-
ards of living are being guaranteed to a soci-
ety and economy that are not very flexible. 
In mid-June 2020, President Macron said 
once again that the state needed to be fun-
damentally reorganised; not everything 
could be decided in Paris. He has now given 
his new government the task of negotiating 
the transfer of powers with regional repre-
sentatives and modernising public adminis-
tration. 
Following the protests of the Yellow 
Vests, Macron finally opted for more citizen 
participation – assemblies, and also the 
extended possibility of referenda – but 
without any binding or direct influence on 
decision-making processes. The low turnout 
in the 2020 local elections seems to have 
prompted Macron to give more say to the 
citizens’ assemblies. The day after these elec-
tions, he decided that the National Assembly 
should turn 147 of the 150 proposals of the 
“Citizens’ Convention on Climate” into 
legislative proposals. Since 4 October 2019, 
150 randomly selected citizens had drawn 
up proposals for a “profound change in 
society” to counteract climate change. The 
fact that these proposals are now to become 
law is a step in the direction of the democ-
ratisation of France. With this step, how-
ever, the president is also trying to make an 
offer to those voters he recently lost to the 
Greens. The Green electorate in 2020 is 
almost identical to the one that voted for 
Macron in 2017: urban, young, educated, 
well-paid, and pro-European. But above 
all, they want a more cosmopolitan France. 
Transformation Remains the Goal 
If this plan works out, Marine Le Pen is likely 
to be marginalised. Strengthening reform-
minded forces would put an end to the in-
fighting between her and Macron, and it 
would enable social reconciliation and politi-
cal transformation in France beyond 2022. 
Macron’s new approach would therefore 
also be good for Germany and the EU. In 
order to keep the political extremes in France 
at bay, President Macron has repeatedly 
been forced in the past to abandon Franco-
German relations and to criticise Germany’s 
EU policy unusually harshly. In order to 
give the impression that France counts in 
the world, he even undermined Berlin in 
foreign policy. A greater domestic scope 
for reform should bring France’s president 
back to the centre of Europe. The German 
government should encourage Macron’s 
efforts, intensify the Franco-German com-
promise process and, together with Macron, 
lead the EU out of its crisis. In doing so, 
it would also counteract Germany’s dwin-
dling influence in Brussels. 
Dr Ronja Kempin is Senior Fellow in the EU / Europe Division.  
Dominik Rehbaum is student assistant in the EU / Europe Division. 
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